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Chinese studies specialists are familiar with the writings of Arif Dirlik.
(1)
The recent release of a collection of texts published by the Chinese
University of Hong Kong (CUHK) on the occasion of a series of lectures
delivered at Tsinghua University in 2010 has the advantage of bringing to-
gether in one volume texts that represent different aspects of a work as com-
plex as it is singular. This book provides a wide-ranging look at the reflections
of this renowned specialist in Chinese anarchism and Marxist historiography,
and offers an overview of his original perception of intellectual and cultural
developments that go beyond China. He takes on the phenomenon of capi-
talist globalisation and analyses the apparently contradictory resurgence of
traditions that only yesterday seemed to be condemned by the dominant
discourse of Eurocentric modernity. These pages attempt to clarify the essen-
tial issues that span the dozen texts in the collection, in particular the indi-
genisation of knowledge in the context of capitalist globalisation.
Born in 1940, Arif Dirlik is a historian of communism and a radical social
critic. Of Turkish origin, he has spent most of his academic career at American
universities. Specialising first in the history and historiography of Chinese an-
archism and communism, (2) during the 1990s he became a particularly astute
observer and a sophisticated theorist of the new linguistic and historical
arrangements that have altered China’s accession to a complex and still un-
finished globalisation process. From the mid 1990s, in parallel with the sig-
nificant intellectual reconfiguration following the dramatic events of 1989
– both in China and around the world – Dirlik undertook work that combines
reflections on deconstructing the presuppositions of Eurocentric modernity
(in particular its modernising discourse, ideology of development, and liberal
democracy) – which he renames Euromodernity – with the return of reflec-
tions on national identity in China. At the same time, he foreshadowed the
renewal of Marxist theory as a tool for analysing the contemporary world. (3)
This sensitivity to identity – which must be differentiated from the narrow
nationalism that, paradoxically, sometimes feeds on it – should indeed be
reconsidered in the light of postmodern, postcolonial, and subaltern theories
in the context of a globalised “cultural China,” as well as in light of the fact
that communism can no longer answer – as Mao did for a time – the two
fundamental questions of Chinese modernity: identity and its corollary, the
link to the “Other,” usually identified with the West. (4) It should be noted
that Dirlik’s origins allow him to share a certain awareness, and even some
points of view, with postcolonial intellectuals. (5) However, he remains wary
of the exploitation of this new intellectual wealth by a form of nationalism
that endorses cultural relativism in order to invalidate any attempt at a crit-
ical approach to Chinese globalisation from a historical perspective. Dirlik
takes issue with a concerted effort to depoliticise knowledge by moving po-
litical issues into the field of culture, and calls for urgent attention to the po-
litical meaning to be given to culturalist claims about epistemology (p. 61).
In this context, the occasionally difficult reading of his writings offers a schol-
arly argument in which China, far from essentialist discourses, regains its
uniqueness. This argument, by going beyond China’s national borders, forces
us to rethink Chinese experience in world history in the course of being
forged between “identity,” “globalisation,” and “capitalism.” 
Native epistemology
The book focuses on three benchmarks: the repudiation of the revolution-
ary sequence after 1978, the return of the Chinese past (long considered
an embarrassing obstacle) as the very source of power and national wealth,
and the context of globalisation (pp. ix-x). From this perspective, the revival
of Confucianism in China is part of a broader rise of previously disqualified
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traditions and ideologies authorised by the repudiation of Eurocentrism. In
China, Confucianism had evolved from a discourse of universal scope to a
mere cultural referent limited to a national past. Dirlik sees its renewal as
part of a global resurgence of indigenous claims to “ways of seeing” and
“ways of knowing” that, from Islam to Hinduism, from Buddhism to Turkish
nationalism, take place at the same time, while responding to very different
social and historical contexts (p. 37). These appeals to tradition in order to
“sinicise” sociology, or to “islamise” anthropology, as well as the return to
“classical” epistemologies in order to reaffirm “national studies,” wherever
they come from, have in common a reference to old inheritances. (6)Yet, far
from being the frozen relics of a glorious past, those traditions are in fact
products of modernity (pp. 38-39), which the Israeli sociologist Shmuel
Eisenstadt has called “multiple modernities.” (7)
To Dirlik, globalisation coincides with a disillusionment with universalism,
and in turn has opened up spaces for rethinking alternative ways of knowing
(p. 52). This “provincialisation” of Europe is not least a result of the univer-
salisation of knowledge and its appropriation by various social and intellec-
tual worlds that no longer recognise the Euro-American monopoly. It marks
the transformation of Third World intellectuals, who are appropriating the
legacy of modernity (p. 53). Here, Dirlik reaches a paradox. Global or glob-
alised modernity can be seen as the end of colonial hegemonies, as it has
helped plunge the former colonised into a form of modernity that is not
colonial. But we can also see this as a universalisation and a deepening of
colonialism through global internalisation of the premises of a capitalist
modernity closely linked to colonialism (p. 55). From this ambiguity arises
the possibility that our present (the internationalisation of capital, human
migration, cultural conflicts), rather than being a simple decolonisation, is
a reconfiguration of colonialism (p. 56). Dirlik has pointed out the impor-
tance of American academia in the internationalisation of standards of
knowledge and norms of capitalism. He extends this reasoning by arguing
that “the reassertion of traditions often takes the form of articulating those
traditions to the demands of global capitalism” (p. 57).
Thus, from the Global Village to the Internet, the emergence of globalisa-
tion as a paradigm raises many questions centred on a fundamental para-
dox: the awareness that globalisation is the product of a Eurocentric world
order that it calls into question (p. 48). Challenges to the Eurocentric order
are thus built on native or nativist pasts, but without calling for a return to
those pasts. Nativism has no choice but to work with some form of colonial
modernity (p. 48), otherwise it would condemn itself to a relativistic provin-
cialism that refutes universalist claims by denying the longue durée of trade
and global interaction (p. 49). The difference is that globalisation today has
renounced the Eurocentric teleology of modernisation by accommodating
the possibility of specific national trajectories in the deployment of moder-
nity (p. 50). What distinguishes our time from past times is “a willingness
to listen to invocations of cultural legacies, not as reactionary responses to
modernity, but as the very conditions of modernity” (p. 50). The very process
of “cultural extroversion” (8) reveals “the impossibility of sustaining reified,
holistic notions of tradition, which have already been transformed by
modernity and appear as sites of conflict between different social interests
and different visions of the modern” (p. 57). Also revealed in these attempts
at appropriating modernity is the pervasive influence of the ideology of de-
velopment (developmentalism) that has propagated a global faith in a bet-
ter future. To Dirlik, the situation is clear: it is not by denying Euro-American
cultural hegemony that “decolonisation of the mind” can be achieved. It is
much more in a radical refutation of this belief in unlimited development
that Arif Dirlik foresees the possibility of rebuilding a more egalitarian world
order, an assessment that is confirmed every day by “the evidence of the
increased marginalisation and inequality worldwide which has accompanied
the globalization of capital” (p. 58).
The Confucian example
In this perspective, Confucianism – and its renewal – is a central axis of
Arif Dirlik’s reflection on ethno-epistemological claims arising from post-
revolutionary capitalist globalisation. In this way, he integrates China into a
set of broader questions about the relationship between civilisation and
culture, identity and globalisation. “For more than half a century, Chinese
and foreign scholars alike condemned Confucianism to the proverbial dust-
bin of history, as an ideology rendered defunct by Chinese progress toward
modernity, be it under Capitalism or Communism” (p. 97). The May Fourth
generation of intellectuals made Confucianism responsible for all the social
and political problems of the country. Manipulations by unscrupulous politi-
cians further damaged its reputation. Finally, Dirlik sees the failed attempts
to articulate Confucianism with Euromodernity as having completed its dis-
crediting as a coherent philosophical system. Thus, for several generations,
it has seemed an almost paradigmatic example of an outdated ideology, a
sentimental residue of attachment to the memory of a backward-looking
Chinese culture unsuited to the modern world. In any case this was the
“modernist” reading long endorsed by works that became classics and have
marked the Western perception of China, influenced by the radicalism of
the early Chinese modernisers, as Dirlik recalls. (9) However, over the last 30
years, Confucius has become global, from Singapore to American universi-
ties, most recently with the development of the institutes that bear his
name (p. 97). (10) One should, however, pay close attention here: Dirlik does
not focus on the philosophical or anthropological aspects of the doctrine,
but on the ideological and political dimensions of the Confucian renaissance
in the 1980s. (11) He sees this revival as the manifestation of a global post-
colonial discourse, originating in East Asia, which was instrumentalised in
order to ideologically legitimise the capitalist turn of reforms in China.
Confucianism is now reassessed in the light of recent Asian economic suc-
cesses, but it cannot ignore the lasting effects of the “identity crisis” that
affected Chinese intellectuals confronted with two major Euromodern dis-
courses, liberal and Marxist, during what the Chinese still refer to as the
“century of humiliation” (bainian guochi, 1842-1949). Dirlik points out that
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10. The first Confucius Institute opened in 2004 in Seoul. There are now more than 300 in more than
50 countries. In addition to teaching the language, the mission of these schools is spreading Chi-
nese “culture.”
11. On the philosophical aspects of modern Confucianism, see Sébastien Billioud, “Thinking Through
Confucian Modernity,” Modern Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 5, Leiden, Brill, 2011.
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modern Chinese thought benefited from “the backing of the two most pow-
erful theories of modernity, Marxism and Weberianism” (pp.  102-103).
Marxism sees Confucianism as the ideological expression of a class that
ruled over a long period, which was deemed “feudal” and destined to dis-
appear. Conversely, Confucianism can be kept as a marker of Chinese na-
tional identity only if it is relegated to a past that is reified and condemned
wholesale, “placed in a ‘museum,’ preserved for posterity and prevented
from interfering with the tasks of modernization” (p. 103). (12)
Similarly, by designating it as an obstacle to capitalism, Max Weber strongly
condemned what he perceived as the shortcomings of Confucianism at the
time. Confucian rationalism meant rational adjustment to the world; Puritan
rationalism meant rational mastery of the world. (13) As we can see, while one
discourse places Confucianism in a museum, the other simply dismisses it.
Dirlik sees these condemnations as a little too “convenient” (p. 104). He re-
calls the comment of the famous reformer Liang Qichao (1873-1929), who
believed that while “science” and “democracy” were indeed two worthy lega-
cies of Western modernity, the unprecedented devastation and destruction
of the First World War definitively invalidated any blind adherence to the pil-
lars of the Euromodernity. (14) Thus, beginning in the 1930s, in the attempt to
reconcile China with the West, there gradually emerged a “new Confucian-
ism” (not to be confused with the “Neo-Confucianism” of the Song Dynasty
in the thirteenth century), which sought to reaffirm the intrinsic value of the
doctrine, reinterpreting it as an ethical-spiritual system perfectly reconcilable
with science and democracy. The names of its advocates are well known, and
their political allegiances range from cultural conservatism to (anticommu-
nist) socialism to nationalism, and most often agree with the critiques of
modernity formulated by the likes of Gandhi in India (p. 104). In 1958, in
Hong Kong, Mou Zongsan, Tang Junyi, Zhang Junmai, and Xu Fuguang signed
a long “Manifesto to the world for the revaluation of Chinese culture” (Wei
Zhongguo wenhua jinggao shijie renshi xuanyan), which was a major mile-
stone in the chronology of Confucian revival, although at the time of its pub-
lication circulation of the text was confined to the borderlands of Chinese
intellectual life constituted by Taiwan and Hong Kong (p. 106). (15) After the
collapse of 1989 and the end of the Cold War (1947-1991), these spaces, in
fact, continued to play a central role in the global and post-revolutionary re-
configuration of contemporary “cultural China.” (16)
The reversal of fortune in the 1980s came with social, political, and especially
economic success. “What was to change almost overnight was not the content
of Confucianism, but the evaluation of that content in relation to the question
of modernity” (p. 107). In the blink of an eye, what had long been seen as an
irremediable obstacle to modernity was transformed into a dynamic force of
that modernity, and a model to be imitated. This renaissance coincided more
or less with the end of the revolutionary period, symbolised by the death of
Mao in 1976, “which was to create a crisis in the historical paradigm based on
the teleology of the revolution” (p. 107). Logic would demand that this revival
of the tradition should lead to questioning the socialist identity built on the
negation of the whole tradition. The very return of Confucianism as the ideol-
ogy of development invalidates the logic of the twentieth century in China as
a whole. There remains only to take the Sinicisation of Marxism as a necessary
bridge between communist ideology and the return to a deep cultural struc-
ture. The idea of continuity in Chinese history takes on a new meaning: Jin
Guantao’s “integrated system” or Prasenjit Duara’s “cultural nexus of power”
may need to be reassessed in the light of this new “regime of historicity,” (17) all
the more so as in the emulation of economic success other models of “cultural
China” have appeared – the Dragons of the periphery – whose success Beijing
is eager to recuperate by becoming once again the centre of a modernised
Confucian ideological agenda. These economic successes, attributed in large
part to Confucianism, also create a new audience: “the managerial public in
charge of global corporations” (p. 108) and the managerial ideology where
employer paternalism is combined with the dream of workers’ docility, a dream
that is daily contradicted by social reality.
Overnight, what was considered an obstacle to modernity was trans-
formed into a powerful dynamic driving what has become an exemplary
modernity (p. 107). Dirlik lists the “major” moments – conferences, publi-
cations – of this Confucian revival, in which Hong Kong (CUHK New Asia
College was founded by Qian Mu in 1963) played a particular part as a
meeting place between Confucians from various Chinese-speaking entities
(p. 110). He also recalls the role of Singapore and Lee Kuan Yew in the po-
litical instrumentalisation of “Asian values.” He does not forget the impor-
tance, everywhere, of official or semi-official support, and the responsibility
of American academics in the imposition of a new discourse on Confucian-
ism (p. 113). In this process, Dirlik pays special attention to the American
philosopher Tu Weiming, and offers a particularly detailed critical reading
of a personality with a complex relation to Chinese culture, who considers
himself somewhat paradoxically an heir to the tradition of May Fourth, and
argues for a “critical reception of Confucianism in order to reconsider its
original moral intent, as against its historical distortion” (p. 133). (18) Dirlik
also shows the precise boundaries of the relevance of his discourse. While
Tu Weiming is constantly on guard against the “dark side” of historical Con-
fucianism, easily prone to becoming an instrument of autocracy (p. 132),
this does not prevent this “fundamentalist missionary in his advocacy of
Confucianism” (p.  130) from simultaneously providing his approval to
regimes that show little concern for democracy. In any case, these examples
of collaboration between certain states and an intellectual discourse achieve
their objective: “to assert an Asian/Chinese presence in contemporary cap-
italism, and Dirlik adds, to participate in the formulation of a coherent ide-
ology for an emerging globalized capitalism” (p. 115).
In all these discussions, in fact, the term “modernisation” is conflated with
“capitalism,” and the identification of modernity with capitalism – a pos-
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tulate of modernising discourses – directs the debates around two issues:
the role of Confucianism in the development of capitalism and its possible
function in limiting the malfunctions of capitalism. However, after some
examples of this Confucian “fever” (education, work, group, harmony...), Dir-
lik cannot help but notice the internal contradictions among the “prolifer-
ating qualifications […] of the so-called ‘post-Confucian hypothesis’”
(p. 121) and, in addition to the existence of national avatars – Japanese, Ko-
rean, Taiwanese, Singaporean – the development of instrumental Confu-
cianisms, whether “vulgar,” “folk,” “social,” or “bourgeois” (p. 125). These
principles of classification, which guide the reorganisation of Confucianism
as a cultural system, eloquently articulate the distance that has been es-
tablished between Confucianism as an ideology of modernisation and the
cultural tradition that inspired it, and which it seeks to preserve (p. 126).
One can feel in these pages the emergence of the idea that this alleged re-
vival is not an adaptation of global capitalism to cultural specificities, but
conversely, the adjustment of a system of “values” to the recommendations
of a globalised capitalism, whose underlying developmentalist discourse
provides the agenda. Dirlik’s conclusion, radical as it is, deserves to be quoted
in its entirety: “Whether as business ideology, academic discipline, or a
source of national identity, its fate [Confucianism] depends on its mar-
ketability in a global cultural commodity market. It is a fate it shares with
other resurgent traditionalisms of Global Modernity” (p. 155).
The modern and the colonial
The keys underlying Dirlik’s reflection on the contemporary world are
probably to be found in the last chapter. As he sees it, while relationships
between the First World and the poor or emerging countries are denser than
ever, and while their differences are now formulated in a common discursive
field, the postcolonial perception of the world remains necessarily marked
by relations between colonisers and colonised (p. 276). He returns to the
responsibility of the “national bourgeoisies” in the perpetuation of colonial
practices and the consequent shift of liberation movements towards social-
ist alternatives (p. 277). Fighting against capitalism was fighting against
colonialism, and vice versa. The Chinese case at the end of the Mao era is
understood as a degradation of anti-colonialism into nationalist fundamen-
talism. Onto Chinese political and economic autarky was grafted an obses-
sion with the national (p.  277), which the discourse of Marxist
internationalism had been able to conceal.
Dirlik notes, however, that alternative modernities – born of hybridity or
postcolonial fundamentalism – are all contained within the horizon of cap-
italism. Their success is measured only in terms of global capitalism without
the most destructive aspect of modernity ever being questioned: the fetishi-
sation of development. These native traditions, revived as a source of alter-
native modernities, but never questioning the goals and tools of
development, ironically find themselves “rendered into symbolic represen-
tations of difference, and evacuated of any substantial content” (p. 279).
Thus, the world of global modernity carries within it the features of a colo-
nial modernity of which it is the product. Even though the colonial state
has largely disappeared, except in cases of ethnic groups resident in nation-
states (such as the Kurds in Turkey, or the Uyghurs in China), “the present
world, in its political mapping, its uneven development, its universalization
of the nation-state, and even in its shared idea of development, remains
very much a product of the modernity Euro/America imposed upon the
world” (p. 284). Claims to alternative modernities are only too rarely claims
to alternatives to modernity (p. 287), and make the pursuit of material de-
velopment look like the last universal value, while under the claims to cul-
tural recognition there does not seem to be any affirmation of equality
between societies, or of equality within societies (p. 297).
In this thirst for recognition, some players are more eager than others, and
China is leading the race. However, Dirlik questions the validity of the Chi-
nese claim to put themselves forward as a “model” (p. 298). Without dis-
puting its undeniable successes, beginning with the escape from material
and cultural poverty of hundreds of millions of men and women, he simply
wonders if the obsession to imitate and overtake the US model is not pri-
marily a validation thereof. There is not, in fact, any Chinese miracle or
“model,” but simply the clever – even brutal – exploitation of existing par-
adigms and an almost naive fetishisation of technology. This is a radical
analysis that does not elude the major part played by coercion in a country
beset by divisions and social conflict, and confronted with enormous envi-
ronmental problems (p. 302). A direct consequence of this culturalist de-
ception about “Chinese characteristics” is the burial of the recent past under
the weight of an older culture, which in the official discourse remains im-
pervious to social and political developments. This cultural reference is
highly useful to justify the restriction of modernisation to science and tech-
nology, and to repudiate other political and social aspects of modernisation,
which are the very essence of any attempt to modernise, but remain at
odds with the “native culture” (p. 300) whose stability has become a dogma.
Finally, we should underscore that the interest of this work, and more widely
of the various works of Arif Dirlik, lies in the in-betweenness that is his speci-
ficity. A global academic in subaltern studies, a postcolonial intellectual in the
American university, he offers a perspective that is all too rare in Chinese stud-
ies: the refusal to adopt cultural relativism in the name of liberation from
colonialism. The radicalism of Arif Dirlik’s discourse is doubly effective. On the
one hand, it brings back to life the achievements of Chinese studies (which
have sometimes nodded off, mired in easy certainties) with rare vigour and
radicalism, particularly by integrating postcolonial semantics into the sino-
logical corpus. On the other, it constantly reminds both the Chinese and others
that the multiple possibilities of new modernities brought by postmodern dis-
courses and theories are problematic precisely because of the shift they in-
duce. This relativism all too often leads to tolerance without limits, including
“tolerance for oppression.” (19) Dirlik thus redefines in consistent terms the mis-
sion of the global intelligentsia. The postcolonial intellectual must recognise
that in order for the subordinate claim to recognition to reach maturity, post-
coloniality, understood as the condition of the intelligentsia under global cap-
italism, must escape from a systematic critique of the West and apply itself
henceforth to providing and developing “practices of resistance against the
system of which it is a product.” (20) In so theorising the means and ends of
the contemporary intellectual, Arif Dirlik redefines the role of the intellectual
in globalisation. This, also, is the reason why we should read Arif Dirlik.
z Translated by Michael Black.
z David Bartel is a PhD candidate at the EHESS-CECMC, Paris, and
associate doctoral fellow at CEFC, Hong Kong. 
EHESS-CECMC, 190-198 avenue de France, 75013 Paris
(db.chine@gmail.com). 
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